An empirical game-theoretic analysis of credit network formation

MP Wellman and B Wiedenbeck Fiftieth Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, October 2012. Abstract The framework of credit networks provides a flexible and robust model of distributed trust, based on pairwise…

Peer-to-peer tangible goods rental

JA Hill and MP Wellman AAMAS-12 Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce (AMEC) and Trading Agent Design and Analysis (TADA), June 2012. Abstract We present a game-theoretic model of online tangible private goods rental. Rental mechanisms…

Scaling simulation-based game analysis through deviation-preserving reduction

B Wiedenbeck and MP Wellman Eleventh International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, June 2012. Abstract Multiagent simulation extends the reach of game-theoretic analysis to scenarios where payoff functions can be computed…

Learning and predicting dynamic networked behavior with graphical multiagent models

Q Duong, MP Wellman, S Singh, and M Kearns Eleventh International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, June 2012. Abstract Factored models of multiagent systems address the complexity of joint behavior by exploiting locality…

Asset pricing under ambiguous information: An empirical game-theoretic analysis

B-A Cassell and MP Wellman Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory 18:445–462, 2012 preliminary version presented at SpringSim Agent-Directed Simulation Symposium, April 2011. Abstract In a representative agent model, the…

Constrained automated mechanism design for infinite games of incomplete information

In general, identifying a solution concept only incompletely specifies a mechanism design problem. The designer must consider which among a multiplicity of solutions is likely to be played, as well as the possibility that actual play will not correspond to any solution. Given that actual play is the ultimate determiner of a mechanism's success, we advocate that designers embrace the corresponding forecasting problem and evaluate candidate mechanisms with respect to belief distributions over players' response. Solution concepts can play a useful role in delimiting and structuring belief distributions. We propose that membership of prospective strategy profiles in various solution classes be treated as evidence bearing on their likelihood of play. Flexible solution classes, for example based on approximate equilibrium, degree of dominance, or safety level, provide natural measures (e.g., distance from equilibrium) that can be employed in defining belief distributions.