Automating markets and trading fulfills a central step in the more comprehensive automation of commerce activity generally. We have therefore devoted significant effort to developing and deploying auctions and related market infrastructure (Lochner and Wellman, 2004, Wurman et al., 1998a, Wurman et al., 1998b), and to characterizing the auction design space (Wurman et al., 2001). Formalizing the available mechanisms opens the possibility of automating the formulation of customized auction mechanisms for particular contract-negotiation episodes (Reeves et al., 2002).
Related Projects and Publications:
- Signal Structure and Strategic Information Acquisition: Deliberative Auctions with Interdependent Values
- Accounting for Price Dependencies in Simultaneous Sealed-Bid Auctions
- Self-confirming price-prediction strategies for simultaneous one-shot auctions
- Peer-to-peer tangible goods rental
- Weighted description logics preference formulas for multiattribute negotiation
- The structure of signals: Causal interdependence models for games of incomplete information
- Multiattribute auctions based on generalized additive independence
- Bidding Strategies for Simultaneous Ascending Auctions
- Stronger CDA Strategies through Empirical Game-Theoretic Analysis and Reinforcement Learning
- Information Feedback and Efficiency in Multiattribute Double Auctions
